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TrustVote: Privacy-Preserving Node Ranking in
Vehicular Networks
Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Samiran Bag, Simon Parkinson, and Feng Hao Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is the network of connected vehicles and transport infrastructure units (Roadside Units
(RSU)), which utilizes emerging wireless systems (4G, 5G, LTE) for the communication and sharing of information. The network of
connected vehicles enables users to disseminate critical information about events happening on the road (for example accidents, traffic
congestions, and hazards). The exchange of information between vehicles and roadside units could improve the driving experience
and road safety, as well as help drivers to identify the hazardous and safe routes in a timely manner. The sharing of critical information
between vehicles is advantageous to the driver; however, at the same time, malicious actors could mislead drivers by spreading
fraudulent and fake messages. Fraudulent messages can have a negative impact on the infrastructure, and more significantly, have
potential to cause threats to the life. It is therefore essential that vehicles can evaluate the credibility of those who send messages
(vehicles or roadside units) before taking any action. In this paper, we present TrustVote, a collaborative crowdsourcing-based vehicle
reputation system that enables vehicles to evaluate the credibility of other vehicles in a connected vehicular network. The TrustVote
system allows participating vehicles to hide their rating/feedback scores and the list of interacted vehicles under a homomorphic
cryptographic layer, which can only be unfolded as an aggregate. The proposed approach also considers the trust weight of a vehicle
providing the rating scores while computing the aggregate reputation of the vehicles. A prototype of TrustVote is developed and its
performance is evaluated in terms of the computational and communication overheads.
Index Terms—Privacy-preservation, Vehicular networks, Reputation system, Secure Multi-party Computation, Private Crowdsourcing
F
1 INTRODUCTION
It is predicted that there will be more than 250 million
connected vehicles by the year 2020 [1], [2]. The emergence
of new telecommunication technologies (e.g., 4G, 5G net-
works) enables vehicles to interact with each other and with
the transport infrastructure (i.e., roadside units (RSU)) for
value-added services. Vehicles in a connected vehicular net-
work could collaborate to provide time-critical information
about what is happening on the road, for example, traffic
congestion, roadside accidents and road hazardous. Such in-
formation is utilized by vehicles and the infrastructure units
alike to make decisions. For example, a vehicle may adjust
its navigation route due to receiving information regarding
congestion, and a traffic management infrastructure might
adjust traffic control timings to optimize throughput.
Figure 1 represents the typical system model of a con-
nected vehicular network, which consists of two main
participants: vehicles each with a wireless communication
link, and the RSUs. The communication between vehicles
is termed as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication and
the communication between vehicles and RSU is termed as
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication [3]. The RSU
is served as the anchor point between vehicles to extend
the footprint of the vehicular network. Vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication can take
place using any of the communication technologies such
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as the short-range communication mechanisms (Dedicated
Short Range Communication technology (DSRC)) and mo-
bile technologies (3G, 4G, 5G, WiMAX, LTE etc) [4]–[6]. The
vehicles share information (such as traffic information, road
situations, road congestion etc.) to each other which could
be utilized in both safety and navigation systems. Vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) is similar in technical implementa-
tion; however, the communication is with infrastructure
components such as Reduced Speed Zone warning signs,
which can automatically communicate key information to
any approaching vehicle or other RSUs. The RSUs can be
connected to each other through the wired network or a
high speed dedicated wireless link. The technique presented
in this paper is infrastructure independent, meaning that
the implementation is not directly related to the physical
network connection. More specifically, it is envisaged that
the implementation would reside within the Session layer
of the Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model).
The communication between vehicles and RSUs has
provided an opportunity for drivers and vehicles to know
about events happening on the road. Drivers can make
decisions based on reports they received from other vehicles
and RSUs, and more significantly, autonomous vehicles will
use received and sensed information to make independent
decisions [7]. A malicious adversary could disseminate fake
and unwanted messages to other vehicles and RSUs in the
network. The distribution of non-trustworthy and malicious
messages over a large network (in terms of vehicles and
RSUs) could be a serious threat to the safety of drivers.
Following on with the example of congestion and its im-
pact on navigation, disseminating spurious messages could
cause vehicles to take a remedial action by re-routing, but
in doing so could cause the road infrastructure to gridlock.
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Fig. 1: System Model of Autonomous Vehicular Network.
It is therefore important that vehicles should evaluate the
trustworthiness of the message sender before making any
maneuver and dissemination of messages to others.
Evaluating the trustworthiness of vehicles in the con-
nected vehicular network is challenging because of the
distributed and ad-hoc nature of the vehicular network.
The trustworthiness of vehicles can be computed in two
ways [8]–[13]: 1) relying on a trusted third party system
for handling data reported by the vehicles, 2) implementing
a distributed system where vehicles can exchange data
directly with each other. In a centralized system, the central-
ized trusted third party serves as the anchor point between
vehicles in the network. However, the centralized system
has the following limitations: 1) it can be a single point of
failure, 2) it can be a central target of an attack, 3) it can pose
threat to the privacy of vehicles as it holds sensitive data
submitted by the vehicles [14], [15]. In a distributed system,
no central authority exists for evaluating the trustworthiness
of nodes, but it brings forth the challenges of privacy-
preservation and scalability.
Vehicles can have different levels of trustworthiness
in vehicular networks. More specifically, if the vehicle is
previously known to be sending correct information or
trustworthy information then this vehicle is considered to
be more trustworthy than any newer vehicle or some other
vehicles in the network. The trust weights of vehicles should
be taken into consideration while computing the aggregated
reputation as this gives more credibility to messages from
the trusted vehicles than other or non-trusted vehicles. The
challenges in the design of a weighted reputation system
for the connected vehicular network are three-fold: 1) the
system should ensure privacy of vehicles providing their
feedback about the behavior of other vehicles, 2) it should
protect the interaction network of vehicles and positions of
vehicles reporting the feedback, and 3) it should perform all
computation in a decentralized manner without consuming
high computation and communication resources.
In this paper, we present TrustVote, a collaborative rank-
ing system that enables vehicles to evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of nodes in the network without relying on any trusted
third party system. The TrustVote system enables vehicles
to utilize feedback from a group of vehicles in a privacy-
preserving manner. Vehicles are placed in a crowdsourcing
group, which provide feedback scores about behavior of
vehicle by encrypting them and only the aggregate will be
revealed to other participants. The TrustVote system is ob-
tained via the integration of a cryptographic mechanism and
the randomization technique used in a boardroom voting
[16]. The design approach has an important feature of not
using the third party for the management of cryptographic
parameters in the encryption and decryption phases. In
addition, the design of TrustVote has the feature of weighted
aggregation, allowing RSUs to assign different weights to
vehicles or response providers in the crowd group. The
building blocks of the TrustVote system consist of two main
components: 1) crowd vehicles providing ratings about the
credibility of other vehicles they have had interaction, and
2) a public tally system that collects rating values from
the selected crowd group. The proposed approach also has
an inherent mechanism for restraining feedback providers
from providing out-of-range rating through the use of non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs of correctness. We have
prototyped the system and evaluated its performance in
terms of computation and bandwidth overheads. Further-
more, we present security proofs to analyze the privacy and
security properties of the TrustVote system.
1.1 Contributions
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We present design of a novel decentralized
crowdsourcing-based system for computing the rat-
ing of nodes in a vehicular network. The designed
system does not require any trusted system for han-
dling cryptographic operations.The system has an
inherent mechanism of assigning weights to nodes
in a crowd group. The system can also be utilized
in any scenario where privacy-preserving weighted
voting is required.
• We present security proofs to analyze both security
and privacy properties of the system.
• We implement a prototype to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the system for the computation and com-
munication overheads.
1.2 Outline
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we de-
fine the problem. Section 3 presents discussions on the
related works. Section 4 presents preliminaries and our
threat model. Section 5 presents the system architecture and
operations of the TrustVote system followed by a compre-
hensive discussion on the privacy and security properties in
a Section 6. Section 7 presents complexity analysis. Section 8
evaluates the performances of TrustVote system. Finally, Sec-
tion 9 presents a conclusion and motivates future research.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Assume there are U vehicles that communicate with other
vehicles and RSU. The vehicles in the network broadcast
their sensed information about what is going on the road
to other vehicles. The vehicles also rate other vehicles based
on the authenticity of the received messages. Let S be the
rating value that a vehicle i (i ∈ 1 . . . , n) has assigned to
the vehicle j (j ∈ 1 . . . , n), and S ∈ 0, 1. We model the
vehicle rating network as a weighted graph network G =
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(U;S;W). Here, U is a set of vehicles rating each other, S is
the rating value assigned by the vehicle Ui to the vehicle
U j , and W is the trust weight of the vehicle rating others.
The link between Ui and Uj exists, only if Ui has rated Uj at
least once. In this paper, we investigate how to compute the
weighted aggregated statistics of a particular vehicle while
keeping trust weights and rating values of vehicles private
to them.
In the context of rating in the vehicular network, we
define the problem as follows. Let there be a network of
U vehicles identified as U1, U2, . . . , Un. Each Ui rates the
vehicle Uj based on the information it receives from the
vehicle with a score si ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ [1, n]. There is a tally
system placed at the RSU that provides an anchor point to
data provided by the participating vehicles. The RSU uses
this data to compute the aggregate ratings of a particular
vehicle. Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be the trust weights of
the rater assigned by the RSU based on their past behavior.
Each wi ∈ [a], where a is a small integer. The tally system
provides an opportunity to compute the weighted average
reputation S˜ = S∑n
i=1 wi
=
∑n
i=1 wisi∑n
i=1 wi
of the target vehicle
without revealing the values of responses provided by the
participating vehicles.
3 STATE OF THE ART
Several approaches have been proposed for the manage-
ment of reputation and trust in the vehicular network.
These systems can operate in the centralized and decentral-
ized system settings [17]–[19]. Ray et al. [20] proposed a
data-centric framework for evaluating the trustworthiness
of nodes in the vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET). The
system weighs each individual response according to well-
defined rules and takes into account the trust weight of the
response provider. However, the privacy of the response
provider or nodes in the network has not been considered
in this design. A centralized system can be used to get
the feedback responses from the vehicles in the network.
This centralized system provides an anchor point that an-
nounces which vehicles in the network are trustworthy and
eliminates the non-trustworthy vehicles from the aggrega-
tion process. BiBmeyer et al. [17] proposed a Misbehavior
Evaluation Authority (MEA) that operates in the back-end
infrastructure. It collects reports from nodes that are directly
involved in witnessing the road hazard. For the detection
of ghost vehicles, the MEA uses trust information from
the participant’s reports. Costantino et al. [21] proposed
a centralized reputation system that identifies insider at-
tackers by considering contextual information derived from
sensors spread along the entire urban network. The roadside
unit acts as the centralized system for the data from the
vehicles in the network. Li et al. [18] utilized the centralized
authentic infrastructure for the collection of trust votes from
the legitimate nodes in the VANET. Their system excludes
votes from malicious nodes in the final aggregation. Marmol
et al. [22] proposed a reputation system that computes
the reputation of a node by considering information from
three different sources i.e. direct previous experiences with
the target node, recommendations from other surrounding
nodes and the recommendation provided by a central au-
thority. The RSU holds the direct experience of nodes and
distinguishes the malicious or selfish nodes in VANETs with
high efficiency and accuracy. Oluoch [23] proposed a system
where the vehicle asks other vehicles to provide their feed-
back about the target vehicle. The system then aggregates
all the feedback with the help of RSU. Dewan et al. [24]
compute reputation of a node by analyzing the number
of packets forwarded by the node in the network. The
nodes become highly reputed if they correctly route packets
for other nodes. Huang et al. [25] proposed DREAMS, a
distributed reputation management system where vehicles
outsource their reputation computation to the edge nodes in
the network. The centralized system has some limitation: 1)
it can be a single point of failure and a single point of attack
to get private information about participants, 2) the nodes
or users in the network have to trust the centralized system
for the protection of their private information.
Decentralized reputation systems, on the other hand, do
not require the centralized trusted system for the collection
and aggregation of the rating scores [26]. Fischer et al. [27]
proposed a reputation system for the Vehicular AdHoc
Network that considers the direct and indirect observation
of a node towards its neighbors. It does not consider a
trusted third party system for the management of data and
responses. Huang et al. [28] proposed a weighted voting
system for computing the reputation of the nodes in the
network. The node’s weight is computed on the basis of the
nodes distance from the event. Yang et al. [29] proposed a
blockchain based decentralized trust management system in
the vehicular networks. In this system, vehicles can assign
a positive vote if they trust the neighboring vehicles and
upload ratings to the Roadside Units (RSU). The RSU then
calculate the trust score for the involved vehicles and pack
these data into a trusted blockchain which is maintained by
all RSUs. The system is decentralized but it has not provided
any mechanism for ensuring vote privacy of vehicles. Fur-
ther, the system does not consider the trustworthy weight
of participating vehicles.
Recent research efforts have developed techniques for
the preserving privacy in the vehicle communication sys-
tems. Asuquo et al. [30] discussed the challenges associated
with maintaining privacy in location-based systems. The
work discusses many potential solutions for maintaining
location privacy, which mainly centers around the use of
cryptography for maintaining the anonymity of the user.
The challenge with the approaches presented in the paper
is that they are centralized techniques, whereby a single
authority is responsible for implementing the anonymity
techniques. This central authority could be the key dis-
tribution system within a cryptographic system, which is
responsible for restricting the system to valid users. The
problem addressed in this paper requires a decentralized
approach due to the scale of the challenge.
In current systems, such as those proposed in [30], trust
is maintained centrally and is vulnerable to attack. Hussain
et al. [31] provide a solution to maintain privacy in witness
services in a vehicle infrastructure. Their system implements
the ElGamal encryption algorithm with elliptic curve cryp-
tography to protect data and uses pseudonyms mechanism
for the identity exchange in order to maintain anonymity.
However, pseudonyms do not provide absolute privacy
protection and identities can be linked using background
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information. Further, the system is dependent on the cen-
tralized system for the public and private keys management.
Similarly, Zhu et al. [32] present a technique for maintaining
privacy in a vehicle social network using the cryptography
method. Although the work preserves identities but does
not address the need to improve the trust of vehicles within
a network. The system requires the trusted authority for the
key management.
The existing reputation systems have not given much
attention to the privacy and data integrity of participants
providing feedback about certain events. The participation
in the aggregation process could leak the location privacy
and the interaction network of vehicles on the road. It is
important that a reputation system should ensure the pri-
vacy of nodes in the network without using any centralized
system. Furthermore, the system should also consider the
weights of nodes while aggregating the individual feedback
without revealing the trustworthy weight of the node. The
reputation system proposed in this paper is not dependent
on the underlying architecture of the vehicular network.
The salient features of the TrustVote system are: 1) It allows
nodes to compute the reputation of a node without relying
on any trusted third-party system, 2) it utilizes weights
assigned to nodes based on their behaviour, 3) the system
ensures privacy of the nodes with the use of an efficient
cryptographic system, 4) the computation is performed in
the decentralized setting.
4 BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we present definitions, the threat model and
background on the homomorphic cryptographic system.
4.1 Definitions
In this section, we present definitions of several important
concepts.
Definition 1. Trust: Trust represents ones own direct confi-
dence or experience with others. It plays an important
role in evaluating the behaviour of entities in the com-
munity. In our context of a vehicular network, for any
two vehicles vi and vj , we use tij to represent the trust
that the vehicle vi has in the vehicle vj . We define tij as
the binary value i.e. either the vehicle vi trust vehicle vj
or not. The trust of vehicle vj in vehicle vi is denoted as
vji. In this paper, our focus is how trust values from the
vehicles are used to compute the aggregate reputation of
the vehicle without revealing the values of trust scores.
Definition 2. Reputation: Reputation can be termed as an
aggregate measure of trustworthiness based on the direct
trust scores provided by the participants in the com-
munity. Let N vehicles have provided their trust scores
for the vehicle j i.e. tij = t1j , t2j , t3j . . . tNj , then the
reputation of vehicle j can be computed as the average
of the direct scores provided by the participating vehicles
as Rj =
∑
tij
N
Definition 3. Privacy In Vehicular Network Vehicles in the
vehicular network communicate with other vehicles and
the fixed infrastructure to have a collaborative value-
added computation about conditions on the road. To
improve the services, the infrastructure units also like to
know the number of vehicles in a particular geographical
region without knowing the identities of the vehicles.
The exchange of information either vehicle to vehicle
or vehicle to infrastructure could bring some benefits
towards driver safety but the exchanged information
could be used by anyone or adversary to track the
private information of vehicles. The trust scores of the
vehicles on the other vehicles could provide information
about the connectivity network of vehicles and possibly
reveal the geographic positions of the vehicles. The em-
phasis of this paper is to camouflage the trust and the
connectivity network of vehicles such that information
remains unlikable and untraceable.
Definition 4. Privacy-preserving Reputation System: Repu-
tation systems have been particularly designed to collect
and analyze personal feedbacks or trust values pro-
vided by the participants of the reputation system. The
privacy-preserving reputation system can be defined as
the reputation system that aggregates the feedback of
participants without posing any threat to their private
data.There are two major challenges in the design of
privacy-preserving reputation systems for the vehicular
networks: 1) the value of the trust scores remains hidden
and unlikable, i.e. only weighted aggregated value of
the trust score is revealed to the protocol participants, 2)
the values could not be used to infer the relationship
network of vehicles. Additionally, the system should
exclude the out-of-range prescribed feedback values.
Sometimes vehicles may behave maliciously in reporting
their feedback scores. They usually assign exceedingly
high feedback scores to maliciously increase the reputa-
tion of some vehicles. This misbehaviour may affect the
accuracy of the aggregated reputation. In this paper, we
consider a vehicle as the malicious if it assigns out-of-
range feedback score to others.
4.2 Threat model and security goals
Our system ensures privacy protection of participants under
the following conditions and assumptions.
Protecting Responses Unless in full collusion, namely,
all n − 1 vehicles colluding again the remaining one, the
adversary will not be able to infer the individual response
of a particular vehicle taking part in providing feedback.
Malicious Model The vehicles can be malicious. In a
malicious model, the participant tries not only to cheat the
system by providing out-of-range prescribe value but also
to infer the response score. We assume that Tally System
is honest but curious in a sense that it does not alter the
provided input data. We assume users are honest in the
sense that if they agree to provide feedback then they will
not refrain from it by not submitting the cryptograms.
4.3 Notations and Cryptographic Approach
A homomorphic encryption system allows parties to com-
pute mathematical functions over the encrypted data. A
homomorphic encryption is a public-key cryptosystem that
allows computation to be performed over the ciphertext,
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Fig. 2: Building Block of TrustVote System.
Symbols Description
RSU Roadside Unit
G cyclic Group of p elements in which DDH problem is hard
U1, U2, . . . , Uu Set of vehicles registered in a roadside unit
(x1i, x2i) Secret key of Ui
(gy1i , gy2i ) restructured key of Ui
(gx1i , gx2i ) public key of Ui
si Secret score of vehicle Ui
wi weight assigned to the score of Ui, 1 ≤ wi ≤ a
αi random element generated by each Ui for generating the encrypted feedback
a max. weight assigned to the scores of vehicles
θ1i, θ2i First auxiliary variables of Ui
δ1i, δ2i Second auxiliary variables of Ui
NIZK non-interactive zero knowledge
[n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}
TABLE 1: Symbols and abbreviations used in the TrustVote System.
which matches the computation performed over the corre-
sponding plaintext. i.e., Enc(a) ∗Enc(b) = Enc(a⊕ b). The
system has application in a number of domains, for example
electronic voting [16], [33], statistical data analysis [34], [35],
secure reputation aggregation [36], [37]. In these settings,
if we have some n number of parties, say p1, p2...pn, each
with a private input x1, x2, . . . , xn, respectively. The par-
ties would like to compute a collaborative mathematical
function over their inputs, say f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without
revealing their individual inputs to anyone else. The homo-
morphic cryptosystem consists of three major algorithms:
Key generation – responsible for generating the public and
private keys, Encryption – responsible for generating the
ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext, and the Decryp-
tion – responsible for deciphering the result from the en-
crypted output. In this paper, we consider the additively
homomorphic encryption system as we are only aggregating
the feedback values from the vehicles.
The cryptographic primitives of TrustVote use the feed-
back randomization technique proposed for the decentral-
ized and verifiable electronic voting [16], [38], but we adopt
the technique for our scenarios by adding weights to each
vote. Let U = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of vehicles registered
with the certain RSU and they provide information about
the events to other vehicles in the network. The vehicle rates
others on the scale of 0 and 1. The value 1 represents that
the vehicle is trusted and 0 represents that it is not trusted.
Let there be a DSA/ECDSA-like multiplicative cyclic group
where p and q are large primes that satisfy q | p − 1. Let
there be a subgroup Gq of order q of the group Z∗p, and g is
a generator of Gq . In order to provide the feedback for the
vehicles, the user first generates a random value (private
key) sk ∈ Zq , and generates the public key pk. The public
key and a proof of knowledge of the private key are posted
at the tally system. The public key is computed as follows:
pki = g
ski
When all the registered vehicles have generated and pub-
lished their public keys on the tally server, the encryption
key (Yi) for the vehicle can be computed as:
Yi =
∏
j∈N,j<i
pkj
/ ∏
j∈N,j>i
pkj
The computation of Yi as above ensures that∏
i∈N
Y skii = 1. (1)
This property is crucial to the design of the proposed sys-
tem. Anyone in the system is able to compute Yi based on
the published pki keys. This randomization technique was
originally intended for encrypting votes in decentralized
e-voting [16]. However, we shall be using it in a different
context as well as making the aggregation performed over
weighted votes to suit our new context.
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4.4 Assumptions
We assume a DSA/ECDSA-like multiplicative G cyclic
group, of prime order q. We also assume that the following
cryptographic assumptions hold in G.
Assumption 1. DDH assumption: Given g, ga, gb and a chal-
lenge Ω ∈ {gab, R}, where R $← G, it is computationally
hard to find whether Ω = gab or Ω = R.
Assumption 2. Given g, ga, gb and a challenge Ω ∈
{gab, gabga}, it is computationally hard to find whether
Ω = gab or Ω = gabga.
Assumption 3. Given g, ga, gb ∈ G, t ∈ Zq and a challenge
Ω ∈ {gab, gabgt}, it is computationally hard to find
whether Ω = gab or Ω = gabgt.
Lemma 1. Assumption 1 implies Assumption 2.
Proof 1. According to the DDH assumption,
(g, ga, gb, gab)
c≈ (g, ga, gb, R), where R $← G. Now,
(g, ga, gb, R)
c≈ (g, ga, gb, R ∗ ga) c≈ (g, ga, gb, gabga).
Hence, the DDH assumption implies Assumption 2.
Lemma 2. Assumption 1 implies Assumption 3.
Proof 2. According to the DDH assumption,
(g, ga, gb, gab)
c≈ (g, ga, gb, R), where R $← G. Now,
(g, ga, gb, R)
c≈ (g, ga, gb, R ∗ gt) c≈ (g, ga, gb, gabgt).
Hence, the DDH assumption implies Assumption 3.
Proposition 1. Let, x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ Znq . Then∑n
i=1(
∑i−1
j=1 xj −
∑n
j=i+1 xj)xi = 0.
proof: ∑n
i=1(
∑i−1
j=1 xj −
∑n
j=i+1 xj)xi
=
∑n
i=1
∑i−1
j=1 xixj −
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1 xixj
=
∑n
i=1
∑
j<i xixj −
∑n
i=1
∑
j>i xixj
=
∑n
j=1
∑
j>i xixj −
∑n
i=1
∑
j>i xixj .
as,
∑n
j=1
∑
j>i xixj =
∑n
j=1(x1 + x2 + . . .+ xj−1)xj
= x1
∑n
j=2 xj + x2
∑n
j=3 xj + · · ·+ xi−1
∑n
j=i+1 xj + · · ·+
xn−1xn
=
∑n
i=1
∑
j>i xixj
Hence,
∑n
i=1(
∑i−1
j=1 xj −
∑n
j=i+1 xj)xi = 0.
5 TRUSTVOTE: SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND
PROTOCOL OPERATIONS
In this section, we present the system architecture and
protocol operations of TrustVote system.
5.1 System Architecture
Figure 2 represents the block diagram of the TrustVote
system. The system consists of three major parties: a vehicle
that receives messages from other vehicles and rates them
on the basis of trustworthiness of the received messages,
the RSU that provides links between vehicles, and the
tally system which holds cryptographic parameters, the
encrypted feedback provided by the participating vehicles
and associated zero-knowledge proofs to prove the well-
formedness of the encrypted feedback scores. The vehicles
communicate to each other and to RSU through the onboard
wireless channel. The RSU communicates with each other
through a dedicated wireless or wired channel. The tally
system is the dynamic database that is placed at the RSU. To
use the functionalities of the TrustVote system, the RSU asks
vehicles to provide their feedback about the validity and
authenticity of the messages they have received from other
vehicles. The vehicle responds to the RSU request by pre-
senting the encrypted feedback to the public tally system,
which is available to all other parties in the system. Along
with the encrypted feedback, the vehicle also transmits
its identity to the RSU. The RSUs are interconnected and
exchange aggregate scores of vehicles to each other. Further,
the RSU maintains the weighted aggregated reputation of
the vehicles. Every time when the vehicle receives a message
from another vehicle, it first asks the serving RSU for the
updated trustworthiness of the vehicle before making any
decision on the message.
The TrustVote system is infrastructure-independent,
meaning that the implementation is not directly related to
the physical network connections. Practically, the TrustVote
system is implemented using the standard existing commu-
nication practices used in the deployment of RSU and ve-
hicular networks. The TrustVote system can also utilize the
current infrastructure and computing devices used within
the vehicular network without changing or placing any new
system. As such, the TrustVote system is designed to be
flexible in terms of the number of vehicles connected to the
particular RSU and is capable of being highly distributed.
Particularly, the deployment of RSUs in the vehicular net-
work is expensive and difficult to manage. Due to this, we
recommend the trade-off between full connectivity through
RSUs and their deployment cost. Note that our system does
not require any special rule for the placement of RSUs and
can be integrated with the current deployment practices
of RSUs [39]. To facilitate the communication for the large
footprint of RSU and high mobility speed, technologies like
Cellular networks (3G, 4G, WiMAX, and LTE) can be used
for the communication between RSU and vehicles.
5.2 Protocol Operations of TrustVote System
We now explain the core functionality of the TrustVote
system. The system enables Roadside Unit (RSU) to ask
a set of trusted and non-trusted vehicles to provide their
views about other vehicles in the network. The participating
vehicle then responds with the encrypted response to the
tally system. The feedback process consists of two steps. 1)
The vehicle generates public and private keys, keeps private
key secret and shares the public key to the tally system along
with a proof of knowledge of the private key. 2) The vehicle
computes a restructured key and encrypts its responses with
the restructured key and the private key. The vehicles can
also get the final aggregate score of any vehicle from the
RSU.
Let G be a multiplicative group of p elements, where p is
a prime number. The Decisional Diffie Hellman problem is
intractable in the group G. Let g be a random generator of
G. The protocol consists of the following steps.
5.2.1 Protocol Setup
The roadside unit RSU selects two integers ω1, ω2 ∈ Zq and
computes two variable σ1 = gω1 and σ2 = gω2 . The RSU
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posts these variable on the tally system. The RSU also posts
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of PW [ω1 : σ1] and
PW [ω2 : σ2] on the tally system. The PW [ωi : σi] provides
a proof that the RSU knows the value of a ωi, such that
σi = g
ωi , for all i ∈ {1, 2}. The RSU then broadcast its
query to the selected vehicles in the network.
The vehicle Ui; i ∈ [1, n] then selects two random inte-
gers a1i, b1i ∈ Zq and computes θ1i = ga1i and δ1i = gb1i .
The vehicle Ui posts θ1i and δ1i on the tally server along
with respective NIZK proofs PW [θ1i : g] and PW [δ1i : g]
of knowledge of θ1i and δ1i.
The RSU computes θ2i = (gwi/(θ1i)ω1)1/ω2 and
δ2i = 1/(δ
ω1
1i )
1/ω2 for all i ∈ [1, n]. The RSU also
computes two non-interactive zero knowledge proofs
PW [θ1i, θ2i, σ1, σ2, g] and PW [δ1i, δ2i, σ1, σ2, g] for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. The first NIZK proof proves the fact that
θω11i θ
ω2
2i ∈ {1, g, g2, . . . , ga} without revealing the values
of ω1 or ω2. The second NIZK proof proves the fact
that θω11i θ
ω2
2i = 1. Details of the construction of these
two proofs have been elaborated in the Appendix sec-
tion. The RSU posts θ2i, δ2i, PW [θ1i, θ2i, σ1, σ2, g] and
PW [δ1i, δ2i, σ1, σ2, g] on the tally system, for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}.
5.2.2 Sharing Cryptographic Parameters
This phase consists of two steps. 1) Vehicles generate crypto-
graphic keys, and 2) creates cryptogram of response. The ve-
hicle Ui, i ∈ [1, n], selects random values x1i, x2i ∈ Zq as the
private key, and publishes public key pki = (X1i, X2i) =
(gx1i , gx2i) on the tally system. The x1i, x2i remains secret
to the vehicle. The vehicle Ui generates separate proofs of
knowledge for the knowledge of x1i and x2i. These are de-
noted as PWi[xji : Xji] for j = 1, 2. Note that the construc-
tion of these two NIZK proofs is same as PW [ω1 : σ1]. The
vehicle then computes the restructured key (Y1i, Y2i), where
Yji = g
yji = g
∑i−1
k=1 x
jk−∑nk=i+1 xjk = ∏i−1k=1 gxjk∏n
k=i+1 g
xjk ,∀j = 1, 2.
5.2.3 Reporting Encrypted Responses
The vehicle Ui, i ∈ [1, n] selects a random αi ∈ Zq and
computes the cryptogram of feedback ci = (B1i, B2i, Ai) as
follows:
B1i = Y
x1i
1i (θ1i)
si(δ1i)
αi (2)
Ai = g
αi (3)
B2i = Y
x2i
2i (θ2i)
si(δ2i)
αi (4)
where, si ∈ {0, 1} is the secret score of Ui. The vehicle
Ui, i ∈ [1, n] then constructs a NIZK proof
PWi[B1i, B2i : X1i, X2i, Y1i, Y2i, θ1i, θ2i, δ1i, δ2i, Ai]
The cryptogram of feedback and NIZK proof is then posted
on the tally system.
5.2.4 Well-formedness of Responses
Each participating vehicle Ui, i ∈ [1, n] constructs a NIZK
proof
PWi[B1i, B2i : X1i, X2i, Y1i, Y2i, θ1i, θ2i, δ1i, δ2i, Ai]
This NIZK proof proves the well-formedness of Bji for
j = 1, 2 given Xji = gxji , Yji = gyji , θji, δji, Ai = gαi
and si ∈ {0, 1}. The proof convinces everyone that the
encrypted feedback represents either a zero score or a
one score. In other words, it proves that the following
statement σ is correct: σ ≡ ((B1i = Y x1i1i δαi1i ) ∧ (B2i =
Y x2i2i δ
αi
2i )) ∨ ((B1i = Y x1i1i θ1iδαi1i ) ∧ (B2i = Y x2i2i θ2iδαi2i )).
Here, the secret inputs of the vehicle Ui are
x1i, x2i, αi, and the publicly known variables are
B1i, B2i, Y1i, Y2i, θ1i, θ2i, δ1i, δ2i, Ai = g
αi . The NIZK
proof is constructed using standard Σ protocol and then
it is made non-interactive by means of the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. A detailed construction of this NIZK proof can be
found in the Appendix.
5.2.5 Tallying Final Score
In the final step, the RSU accesses data from the tally
system and checks its well-formedness proofs. Given the
well-formed cryptograms C = (C1, C2) for j = 1, 2 from
the tally server, the RSU executes following steps while
computing the final score.
Cj =
n∏
i=1
Bji (5)
=
n∏
i=1
Y
xji
ji θ
si
jiδ
αi
ji (6)
=
n∏
i=1
gxjiyjiθsijiδ
αi
ji (7)
= g
∑n
i=1 xjiyji
n∏
i=1
θsijiδ
αi
ji (8)
From proposition 1, we can see that
∑n
i=1 xjiyji = 0.
Thus, Cj =
∏n
i=1 θ
si
jiδ
αi
ji for j = 1, 2. Note that this
step can be executed by anyone with read access to
the tally system. The RSU then computes L = Cω11 C
ω2
2
and posts it on the tally server along with the NIZK
proof PWL[L : C1, C2, σ1, σ2]. This NIZK proof proves
the fact that the L posted on the tally server is indeed
equal to Cω11 C
ω2
2 given C1, C2, σ1 and σ2. Note that L =∏n
i=1(θ
si
1iδ
αi
1i )
ω1(θsi2iδ
αi
2i )
ω2 =
∏n
i=1(θ
ω1
1i θ
ω2
2i )
si(δω11i δ
ω2
2i )
αi .
Now, θω11i θ
ω2
2i = g
wi and δω11i δ
ω2
2i = 1 for all i ∈ [1, n].
Hence, L =
∏n
i=1 g
wisi = g
∑n
i=1 wisi = gS . The service
provider then performs a brute force search on L to find
final reputation score S. Brute force search will be feasible
only if S is not too large. The maximum value that S can
take is a ∗ n.
Once the weighted sum S has been computed, the RSU
can calculate the average weighted reputation as follows:
S˜ = S/
n∑
i=1
wi (9)
Once the average reputation of the vehicle is computed, the
RSU lists it as the malicious actor if the aggregate reputation
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of the vehicle is less than some threshold. The simplest
approach to consider the vehicle as malicious is to apply
the fixed or automated threshold. Alternatively, the RSU
can also use machine learning methods for this purpose.
The vehicles can also query the RSU for the final aggregated
score of any vehicle it receives messages before taking any
action.
6 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security properties of our
scheme. We assume that all participants in the aggregation
process, including participating vehicles and roadside units
may be malicious. The NIZK proofs ensure that they strictly
adhere to the protocol specification. They are forced to
follow the protocol operations honestly but they might try
to infer information from the shared data. We also assume
that the participating vehicle can be malicious in providing
their feedback scores, however, we ensure they provide
input within the correct range via the use of NIZK proofs.
The RSU and the tally system only see the cryptograms of
vehicles without having access to the private key of vehicles.
Further, we consider an adversary who, in collusion with
a subset of vehicles, attempts to learn the score of one or
more honest vehicle. We show that the adversary will not
learn anything which the weighted sum S =
∑n
i=1 wisi
does not allow her to know. The security of this scheme
depends upon the intractability of the Decisional Diffie
Hellman problem. Hence, as long as the DDH problem is
hard in the group G, the scheme is secure.
6.1 Correctness of Computation
Here, we show that the scheme described in Section 5 is
correct. The feedback each vehicle Ui : i ∈ [n] sends to
the tally system (i.e., a public bulletin board) is of the form
(B1i, B2i, g
αi), where Bji = Y
xji
ji θ
si
jiδ
αi
ji = g
xjiyjiθsijiδ
αi :
j = 1, 2. The RSU downloads all such feedbacks from the
tally system and computes C = (C1, C2). Cj =
∏n
i=1Bji =
gxjiyjiθsijiδ
αi
ji : j ∈ {1, 2}. From Proposition 1, we can see
that
∑n
i=1 xjiyji = 0 for j = 1, 2. This implies that Cj =∏n
i=1 θ
si
jiδ
αi
ji . We know that θji = g
aji and δji = gbji for j =
1, 2. Hence, Cj =
∏n
i=1 g
ajisigbjiαi . Now, L = Cω11 C
ω2
2 =∏n
i=1 g
(ω1a1i+ω2a2i)si ∗∏ni=1 g(ω1b1i+ω2b2i)αi . a2i and b2is are
made to satisfy ω1a1i + ω2a2i = wi and ω1b1i + ω2b2i = 0
hold. Hence, L =
∏n
i=1 g
wisi = g
∑n
i=1 wisi = gS . Therefore,
the scheme is correct.
6.2 Privacy of Trust Weights
The secret inputs of the RSU are the set of weights
{w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Each wi is used to compute ga2i =
(gwi/ga1iω1)1/ω2 . We need to show that ga2i will not reveal
the value of wi. ga2iω2 = (gwi/ga1iω1). Let us assume that
there is an adversary A that can distinguish between the
two cases wi = w and wi = w′, where w′ > w. We
show that A can be used against Assumption 3. Let the
inputs to the DDH adversary be t, gω2 , ga2i and a challenge
Ω ∈ {ga2iω2 , ga2iω2gt}. Here t = w′ − w. A selects random
a1i ∈ Zq and computes gω1 = (gw′/Ω)1/a1i . Thus, if
Ω = ga2iω2 , then ga1iω1+a2iω2 = gw
′
holds. Alternatively
if Ω = ga2iω2gw
′−w, then ga1iω1+a2iω2 = gw holds. Hence, if
A can distinguish between these two cases, it will amount
to distinguishing between the two possible values of Ω viz.
ga2iω2 and ga2iω2gw
′−w. Thus, we can say that the weights
assigned by the RSU to all the vehicles will remain secret.
6.3 Privacy of Vehicles
The participating vehicles simply provide their feedback in
the encrypted form using the encryption key derived from
the public keys of all vehicles. The vehicles send encrypted
responses to the tally server. The sent responses cannot be
decrypted individually and no vehicle would learn values
of other vehicles even if some vehicles collude with each
other. The malicious vehicle could report out-of-range feed-
back values in order to modify the final aggregated values,
however, the use of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge limits them to provide their inputs within the
prescribed range.
In Lemma 7, we assume there are some k distinct honest
vehicles identified as Ph1 , Ph2 , . . . , Phk , ht ∈ [1, n] for all
t = 1, 2, . . . , k. The weights assigned to Pht are wht for all
ht ∈ [1, n] for all t = 1, 2, . . . , k. We show that for any
two sets of private inputs of the honest vehicles namely
S ′ = {s′ht : 1 ≤ t ≤ k} and S ′′ = {s′′ht : 1 ≤ t ≤ k}
such that s′ht , s
′′
ht
∈ {0, 1},∀t ∈ [1, k] and ∑ki=1 whis′hi =∑k
i=1 whis
′′
hi
, if the k honest vehicles choose either S ′ or S ′′
as the set of score, the RSU will not be able to find whether
S ′ or S ′′ was chosen by the honest vehicles. That is, as long
as the partial weighted sum of the honest vehicles is the
same, the RSU cannot distinguish between two tally systems
corresponding to two different executions of this protocol
where the honest vehicles have used different inputs. In
other words, the protocol only allows the adversary to
learn nothing more than the partial weighted sum of the
secret scores of the honest vehicles. As stated above, the
adversary can trivially compute this partial weighted sum if
she colludes with all other participants (RSU and vehicles),
excepting these k honest vehicles. Thus, we can conclude
that the protocol allows the colluding adversary to know
nothing more than what she could trivially learn using the
inputs of the colluding vehicles. We used Assumption 4
in order to prove Lemma 7. In Lemma 3 we show that
Assumption 4 follows from Assumption 1. In order to prove
Lemma 3, we used Lemma 6. In order to prove Lemma 6,
we needed Assumption 5 and Lemma 5. In Lemma 4, we
show that Assumption 5 follows directly from Assumption
1.
Note that, if only a subset of vehicles collude, they will
learn nothing as the weights assigned to their inputs are
only known to the RSU. and without them, they cannot
even compute the partial weighted sum of their own inputs.
Thus, even if S is made public, the partial weighted sum of
the non-colluding vehicles cannot be computed by them.
6.3.1 Assumptions & Lemmas
Assumption 4. Given g,X1 =
{gx11 , gx12 , . . . , gx1(k−1)},X2 =
{gx21 , gx22 , . . . , gx2(k−1)},
Y1 = {gy11 , gy12 , . . . , gy1(k−1)},Y2 =
{gy21 , gy22 , . . . , gy2(k−1)},A1 = {ga11 , ga12 , . . . , ga1k},
A2 = {ga21 , ga22 , . . . , ga2k},B1 = {gb11 , gb12 , . . . , gb1k},
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B2 = {gb21 , gb22 , . . . , gb2k},ω1, ω2, such that
a1iω1 + a2iω2 = wi,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
b1iω1 + b2iω2 = 0,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1], it is hard to
distinguish between Ω1 = (U1, U2) and Ω2 = (V1, V2),
where U1 = (l11, l12, . . . , l1k),U2 = (l21, l22, . . . , l2k),
V1 = (l
′
11, l
′
12, . . . , l
′
1k),V2 = (l
′
21, l
′
22, . . . , l
′
2k),
lji = g
xjiyjigajisigbjiαi ,∀j = 1, 2; i ∈ [1, k − 1],
l′ji = g
xjiyjigajis
′
igbjiαi ,∀j = 1, 2; i ∈ [1, k − 1],
ljk =
gajkskgbjkαk∏k−1
i=1 g
xjiyji
, l′jk =
gajks
′
kgbjkαk∏k−1
i=1 g
xjiyji
,∀j = 1, 2 and∑k
i=1 wisi =
∑k
i=1 wis
′
i.
Lemma 3. Assumption 1 implies assumption 4.
Proof 3. l1i = gx1iy1iga1isigb1iαi for all i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
l1k =
ga1kskgb1kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x1iy1i
l′1i = g
x1iy1iga1is
′
igb1iαi ,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1] and l′1k =
ga1ks
′
kgb1kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x1iy1i
.
Again, l1i = gx1iy1iga1isigb1iαi for all i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
l1k =
ga1kskgb1kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x1iy1i
l′1i = g
x1iy1iga1is
′
igb1iαi ,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1] and l′1k =
ga1ks
′
kgb1kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x1iy1i
Similarly, l2i = gx2iy2iga2isigb2iαi for all i ∈ [1, k − 1]
and l2k =
ga2kskgb2kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x2iy2i
l′2i = g
x2iy2iga2is
′
igb2iαi ,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
l′2k =
ga2ks
′
kgb2kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x2iy2i
.
Again, l2i = gx2iy2iga2isigb2iαi for all i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
l2k =
ga2kskgb2kαk∏k−1
i=1 g
x2iy2i
l′2i = g
x2iy2iga2is
′
igb2iαi ,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1] and
l′2k =
ga2ks
′
kgb12αk∏k−1
i=1 g
x2iy2i∏k
i=1 lji = g
∑k
i=1 ajisig
∑k
i=1 bjiαi for all j ∈ {1, 2}.
Similarly,
∏k
i=1 l
′
ji = g
∑k
i=1 ajis
′
ig
∑k
i=1 bjiαi for all j ∈
{1, 2}. Let us choose a random r ∈ [1, k]. Now, let
Kj =
∏k
i=1 lji and K
′
j =
∏k
i=1 lji for j ∈ {1, 2}. So,
Kj =
∏k−1
i=1 lji ∗ gbjkαk and K ′j =
∏k−1
i=1 l
′
ji ∗ gbjkαk for
all j ∈ {1, 2}.
We know that
Kω11 K
ω2
2 = (g
∑k
i=1 a1isig
∑k
i=1 b1iαi)ω1(g
∑k
i=1 a2isig
∑k
i=1 b2iαi)ω2 =
g
∑k
i=1 wisi and
K ′ω11 K
′ω2
2 = (g
∑k
i=1 a1is
′
ig
∑k
i=1 b1iαi)ω1(g
∑k
i=1 a2is
′
ig
∑k
i=1 b2iαi)ω2 =
g
∑k
i=1 wis
′
i . Since,
∑k
i=1 wisi =
∑k
i=1 wis
′
i,
Kω11 K
ω2
2 = (g
∑k
i=1 a1isig
∑k
i=1 b1iαi)ω1(g
∑k
i=1 a2isig
∑k
i=1 b2iαi)ω2 =
(g
∑k
i=1 a1is
′
ig
∑k
i=1 b1iαi)ω1(g
∑k
i=1 a2is
′
ig
∑k
i=1 b2iαi)ω2 =
K ′ω11 K
′ω2
2 . Hence from Lemma 6, we may say that
if K1
c≈ K ′1, then (K1,K2)
c≈ (K ′1,K ′2) Hence,
(U1, U2)
c≈ (V1, V2) or Ω1 c≈ Ω2.
Assumption 5. Let, x = (ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gak−1)
and y = (gb1 , gb2 , . . . , gbk−1). Let, X =
(ga1b1 , ga2b2 , . . . , gak−1bk−1). Also let, X =
X1∗X2∗. . .∗Xk and Y = Y1∗Y2∗. . .∗Yk. If X c≈ Y , then(
ga1b1 ∗ X1, ga2b2 ∗ X2, . . . , gak−1bk−1 ∗ Xk−1, Xk∏k−1
i=1 g
aibi
)
c≈(
ga1b1 ∗ Y1, ga2b2 ∗ Y2, . . . , gak−1bk−1 ∗ Yk−1, Yk∏k−1
i=1 g
aibi
)
.
Lemma 4. Assumption 1 implies assumption 5.
Proof 4. Let Ai = gaibi for i ∈ [1, k − 1].
(A1 ∗ X1, A2 ∗ X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, Xk∏k−1
i=1 Ai
) =
(A1 ∗ X1, A2 ∗ X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Xi
).
Since, according to assumption 1; Ai = gaibi
c≈
R,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1], Ai ∗ Xi c≈ Ai ∗ Yi,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1].(
A1 ∗ X1, A2 ∗ X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Xi
)
c≈(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
. Now,
we claim that:(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
c≈(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, Y∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
,
otherwise anyone can distinguish between
X and Y by choosing random Ais and
random Xi’s and thus computing a challenge(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, Q∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
,
where Q ∈ {X ,Y}. If the challenge(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, Q∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
is correctly identified then so will be Q. Hence,(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
c≈(
A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, Y∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
)
. Thus,
the lemma holds.
Lemma 5. Given X1 = X1Z , X2 = X2(Z)−ω1/ω2 and Y1 =
Y1Z , Y2 = Y2(Z)−ω1/ω2 . Also assume that Xω11 Xω22 =
Y ω11 Y
ω2
2 . If Z
c≈ R, then (X1, X2) c≈ (Y1, Y2).
Proof 5. X2 = X2(X1X1 )−ω1/ω2 = (X
ω1
1 Xω22 )1/ω2X−ω1/ω21 .
Similarly, Y2 = Y2( Y1Y1 )−ω1/ω2 = (Y
ω1
1 Yω22 )1/ω2Y −ω1/ω21 .
Now, (X1, X2)
c≈ (X1, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2X−ω1/ω21 ) =
(X1, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2X−ω1/ω21 ) = (X1 ∗
Z, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2(X1 ∗ Z)−ω1/ω2)
c≈
(X1 ∗ R, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2(X1 ∗ R)−ω1/ω2)
c≈
(R, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2R−ω1/ω2). Similarly,
(Y1, Y2)
c≈ (R, (Yω11 Yω22 )1/ω2R−ω1/ω2) =
(R, (Xω11 Xω22 )1/ω2R−ω1/ω2). Thus, (X1, X2)
c≈ (Y1, Y2).
Lemma 6. Let us assume,
X1 = (g
x11 , gx12 , . . . , gx1(k−1))
X2 = (g
x21 , gx22 , . . . , gx2(k−1))
Y1 = (g
y11 , gy12 , . . . , gy1(k−1))
Y2 = (g
y21 , gy22 , . . . , gy2(k−1))
A = (gx11y11 , gx12y12 , . . . , gx1(k−1)y1(k−1))
B = (gx21y21 , gx22y22 , . . . , gx2(k−1)y2(k−1))
X = X ∗ Z = X1 ∗ X2 ∗ . . . ∗ Xk
Y = Y ∗ (Z)−ω1/ω2 = Y1 ∗ Y2 ∗ . . . ∗ Yk
X ′ = X ′ ∗ Z = X ′1 ∗ X ′2 ∗ . . . ∗ X ′k
Y ′ = Y ′ ∗ (Z)−ω1/ω2 = Y ′1 ∗ Y ′2 ∗ . . . ∗ Y ′k
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∃ω1, ω2 ∈ Zq such that Xω1Yω2 = X ′ω1Y ′ω2 holds. If
Z c≈ R, where R $← G, then (ψ1, ψ′1)
c≈ (ψ2, ψ′2), where
ψ1 =
(
A1 ∗ X1, A2 ∗ X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, Xk∏k−1
i=1 Ai
)
ψ′1 =
(
B1 ∗ Y1, B2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Bk−1 ∗ Yk−1, Yk∏k−1
i=1 Bi
)
ψ2 =
(
A1 ∗ X ′1, A2 ∗ X ′2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ X ′k−1,
X ′k∏k−1
i=1 Ai
)
ψ′2 =
(
B1 ∗ Y ′1, B2 ∗ Y ′2, . . . , Bk−1 ∗ Y ′k−1,
Y ′k∏k−1
i=1 Bi
)
and Ai = gx1iy1i , Bi = gx2iy2i , i ∈ [1, k − 1].
Proof 6. According to assump 5, ψ1
c≈ ψ2 if X c≈ X ′ and
ψ′1
c≈ ψ′2 if Y
c≈ Y ′. Since, Xω1X ′ω2 = Yω1Y ′ω2 . Again,
according to Lemma 5, since Z c≈ R, then (X,X ′) c≈
(Y, Y ′). Hence, (ω1, ω2, ψ1, ψ2)
c≈ (ω1, ω2, ψ′1, ψ′2). So,
the lemma holds.
Lemma 7. In our protocol, if there are some k distinct honest
vehicles identified as Ph1 , Ph2 , . . . , Phk , ht ∈ [1, n] for all
t = 1, 2, . . . , k. Let us assume that the weights assigned
to Pht be wht . Also assume that there exist the following
two sets:
S ′ = {s′ht : 1 ≤ t ≤ k} and S ′′ = {s′′ht : 1 ≤ t ≤ k}
such that s′ht , s
′′
ht
∈ {0, 1},∀t ∈ [1, k] and∑ki=1 whis′hi =∑k
i=1 whis
′′
hi
. If the k honest vehicles choose either S ′ or
S ′′ as the set of score, the RSU will not be able to find
whether S ′ or S ′′ was chosen by the honest vehicles.
That is, the protocol initiator will not be able to distin-
guish between multiple possible sets of distinct values of
inputs of a group of honest vehicles, provided the partial
weighted sum of all inputs of those honest vehicles
remain the same in all the sets.
Proof 7. We assume that Pc1 , Pc2 , . . . , Pcn−k be the
identifier of the n − k corrupt vehicles. Hence,
{cj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n − k} ∪ {hj : 1 ≤ j ≤ k} = [1, n].
Since, the Pc1 , Pc2 , . . . , Pcn−k are corrupted by the RSU,
she can set the keys and scores on their behalf. Let us
assume that scj is the score chosen by the RSU for the
vehicle Pcj , where j ∈ [1, n − k]. We assume that the
secret key of Pcj is (x1cj , x2cj ) and the public key will
be (gx1cj , gx2cj ),∀j ∈ [1, n − k]. Also, assume that the
restructured key of Pcj is (g
y1cj , gy2cj ),∀j ∈ [1, n − k].
Similarly, we assume that the score of Phj be shj and the
secret key of Phj is (x1cj , x2cj ) and the public key will
be (gx1cj , gx2cj ),∀j ∈ [1, n − k]. Also, assume that the
restructured key of Pcj is (g
y1cj , gy2cj ),∀j ∈ [1, n − k].
The RSU can compute the ballot of a corrupt vehicle
Pcj as (B1cj , B2cj ), where j ∈ [1, n − k]. Here, B1cj =
gx1cj y1cj (θ1cj )
scj (δ1cj )
αcj = gx1cj y1cj ga1cj scj gb1cjαcj ,
and B2cj = g
x2cj y2cj (θ2cj )
scj (δ2cj )
αcj =
gx2cj y2cj ga2cj scj gb2cjαcj .
Similarly, the ballots of the k honest vehicles are of the
form (B1hj , B2hj ), where j ∈ [1, k]. Here,
B1hj = g
x1hj y1hj (θ1hj )
shj (δ1hj )
αhj
= gx1hj y1hj ga1hj shj gb1hjαhj
B2hj = g
x2hj y2hj (θ2hj )
shj (δ2hj )
αhj
= gx2hj y2hj ga2hj shj gb2hjαhj
Obviously,
∑k
j=1 x1hjy1hj +
∑n−k
j=1 x1cjy1cj = 0 and∑k
j=1 x2hjy2cj +
∑n−k
j=1 x2cjy2cj = 0.
So,
∑k
j=1 x1hjy1hj = −
∑n−k
j=1 x1cjy1cj and∑k
j=1 x2hjy2hj = −
∑n−k
j=1 x2cjy2cj .
gx1hky1hk = g−
∑n−k
j=1 x1cj y1cj ∗ g−
∑k−1
j=1 x1hj y1hj and
gx2hky2hk = g−
∑n−k
j=1 x2cj y2cj ∗ g−
∑k−1
j=1 x2hj y2hj .
Hence, we can rewrite B1hk and B2hk as,
B1hk =
g
a1hk
shk g
b1hk
αhk
g
∑n−k
j=1
x1cj
y1cj ∗g
∑k−1
j=1
x1hj
y1hj
and
B2hk =
g
a2hk
shk g
b2hk
αhk
g
∑n−k
j=1
x2cj
y2cj ∗g
∑k−1
j=1
x2hj
y2hj
.
Since, the values of x1hj and x2hj for j ∈ [1, n − k]
are set by the RSU, she can compute g
∑n−k
j=1 x1cj y1cj
and g
∑n−k
j=1 x2cj y2cj . So, she can compute
l1hk = B1hk ∗ g
∑n−k
j=1 x1cj y1cj = g
a1hk
shk g
b1hk
αhk
g
∑k−1
j=1
x1hj
y1hj
and l2hk = B2hk ∗ g
∑n−k
j=1 x2cj y2cj = g
a2hk
shk g
b2hk
αhk
g
∑k−1
j=1
x2hj
y2hj
.
Let us denote l1hj = B1hj and l2hj = B2hj for all
j ∈ [1, k − 1]. Also denote, l′1hj = l1hj and l′2hj = l2hj if
shj = s
′
hj
for j ∈ [1, k].
Also denote, l′′1hj = l1hj and l
′′
2hj
= l2hj if shj = s
′′
hj
for
j ∈ [1, k].
Again, denote U1 = (l′1h1 , l
′
1h2
, . . . , l′1hk),
U2 = (l
′
2h1
, l′2h2 , . . . , l
′
2hk
) and V1 = (l′′1h1 , l
′′
1h2
, . . . , l′′1hk),
V2 = (l
′′
2h1
, l′′2h2 , . . . , l
′′
2hk
). Now, since,
∑k
i=1 whis
′
hi
=∑k
i=1 whis
′′
hi
from assumption 4, we can say that
(U1, U2)
c≈ (V1, V2). Hence, the result holds.
7 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the computation and communi-
cation complexity of our proposed scheme. Table 2 provides
the computational and communication overheads for a ve-
hicle and the RSU. In our settings, RSU initiates the voting
and aggregation phases. During the initialization the RSU
Pi computes two elements θ1i = ga1i and δ1i = gb1i . This
requires 2 exponentiations. An encrypted feedback is of the
form 〈B1i, B2i, gαi〉, where Bji = Y xjiji θsijiδαiji , j = 1, 2, and
αi ∈ Zq . Hence computation of an encrypted response re-
quires 5 exponentiations. Computation of the NIZK proof of
well-formedness of the feedback needs 22 exponentiations.
The RSU needs to compute σ1, σ2 and {θ2i, δ2i : i ∈ [1, n]}
during initialization stage. This requires doing 2n+ 2 expo-
nentiations. Again, the RSU needs to do 15n+ 8 exponenti-
ations to compute all the NIZK proofs.
Initially, each participating vehicle needs to post θ1i, δ1i.
Hence, during initialization, the communication overhead
on a vehicle is 2. The communication overhead to post
the encrypted response is 3. Also, each vehicle needs to
communicate the NIZK proof of well-formedness of an
encrypted feedback which is of size 22. The RSU needs to
communicate σ1, σ2 and {θ2i, δ2i : i ∈ [1, n]} to the tally
system during the initialization. Hence, the overhead during
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Entity Computational overhead (number of exponentiations) Communication overhead
Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof Tallying Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof
Vehicle 2 5 22 - 2 3 22
CP 2n+ 2 - 15n+ 8 2 2n+ 2 - 18n+ 12
TABLE 2: Protocol Overhead
Operation Computation Cost Communication Cost
Setup - 4n+ 2
Key - 2n
Feedback - 3n
Verification of all NIZK Proofs 38n+ 5an+ 9 exponentiations 32n+ 5na+ 11
TABLE 3: Cost for Public Verification
(a) Vehicle (b) Vehicle
Fig. 3: Vehicle computation time: a) computation time for varying number of participating vehicles, b) computation time
for varying number of vehicles for which feedback are provided.
initialization is 2n+2. Also, the communication overhead of
storing all NIZK proofs computed by the RSU is 18n+ 12.
The feedback verification is important to handle the
malicious vehicles providing out-of-range feedback scores.
Table 3 provides the computational and communication
overhead on a public verifier to verify all the information
(including the final reputation score) provided on the tally
system.
8 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We developed a prototype for the vehicle to report the
responses and the analyst for aggregating the responses
using Java programs. We evaluated the performance on a
system with a CPU 3.6 GHz core i7 and 8 GB memory. At the
vehicle side, we evaluated the performance for two aspects:
1) the varying number of vehicles agreed on providing the
responses and 2) the number of cryptograms. The perfor-
mance measurements have been taken for the single core.
Our evaluation network involves the following scenario.
The RSU requests vehicles registered with it to provide their
feedback response for other vehicles. The vehicle provides
the encrypted responses to the tally system (a public bulletin
board) located at the roadside unit. We assume that RSUs
are connected to each other and exchange aggregate score
of vehicles attached to them with each other.
8.1 Computation Benchmarks
The vehicle providing the feedback response has two major
responsibilities: 1) generating the cryptogram of feedback
score, and 2) generating the NIZK proof to prove the well-
formedness of the encrypted score. Figure 3 shows the
vehicle’s computation time for two scenarios: a) varying the
number of vehicles who agreed to provide the feedback,
and b) varying the number of vehicles for which vehicle
is required to submit feedback while fixing the number of
agreed vehicles to 1000. For the first case, the number of
vehicles agreed to provide the feedback is varied from 100
to 10000 while the number of vehicles for which response is
provided is fixed at 1000. For the second case, the number
of vehicles is varied from 50 to 1000. It can be seen from
Figure 3.B that computation time increases linearly with the
number of target vehicles. Specifically, for the 3000 vehicles,
each vehicle requires around 15 seconds to generate the
complete cryptogram (encrypted feedback and NIZK). We
can observe from Figure 3.A that varying the number of
vehicles would not largely effect the computation time.
Figure 4 presents the time required by the RSU for com-
puting the final tally for each of the vehicles. The RSU would
compute the tally from 100K feedback in around 8 seconds.
This time does not include the checking of NIZK proof
which is the most expensive operation at the aggregator
side.
The safety critical messages require an immediate re-
sponse from the vehicles. In the proposed scheme, the
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(a) RSU Aggregation (b) Verification
Fig. 4: Computation Time for the aggregation and verification a) aggregation time for the varying number of cryptograms,
b) Verification for the varying number of cryptograms.
vehicle needs to evaluate the trustworthiness of the vehicle
from which it received the messages before executing any
action. This would incur a delay. Delay in V2I is the time
duration when the vehicles receive the message (critical
safety message or non-critical messages) from other vehicles
and retrieve the reputation score from the RSU. In our
scheme, most of reputation computation and aggregation
is performed by the RSUs. The same global reputation score
is then replicated across all the RSUs. The delay incurred
by our method is negligible as it only needs to search
the database and purely dependent on the quality of the
wireless link between the vehicle and the RSU. The use of
high speed dedicated channel would greatly minimize the
delay between the RSU and the vehicle. Alternatively, the
vehicle also fetches the complete list of vehicles from its
connected RSU and decides about the vehicle based on its
query to the local database. However, this would increase
the load on the vehicle both in terms storage and searching
the local database.
# of Vehicles Vehicle to Tally # of Cryptograms Verification
50 41Kb 1000 18.9Mb
100 81Kb 2000 37.8Mb
150 121Kb 5000 94.8Mb
200 162Kb 10000 190.3Mb
300 244Kb 20000 378.8Mb
500 412Kb 30000 568.8Mb
1000 816Kb 40000 757.76Mb
2000 1.7Mb 60000 1.36GB
3000 2.6Mb 100000 1.849GB
TABLE 4: Bandwidth Overhead for the Vehicle and the Tally
System. # of cryptogram is the total number of cryptograms
at the tally system.
8.2 Communication Benchmark
We now turn to discuss the communication bandwidth re-
quired by each vehicle and the storage overhead required by
the tally system to handle the responses from 1000 vehicles.
The communication overhead for the vehicle and RSU is
shown in Table 8.2. A single-vehicle sends around 11 MB
data during the whole protocol operations for 10 videos and
9 different questions. Again it can be seen that the most
bandwidth intensive operation is the transport of NIZK
proofs that alone consume around 9 MB of bandwidth. At
the vehicle side, the bandwidth required does not go beyond
10 MB over the period of one day which is also reasonable in
the presence of WIFI network or mobile data enabled smart-
phones. The storage requirement at RSU side is reasonable
as RSU already has a large storage space and can handle
responses even from hundreds of thousands of users.
One of the major properties of TrustVote along with
privacy-preservation is the verification of aggregating score
of the object without relying on any trusted setup and
a trusted third party system. In the verification process,
participating vehicles should be able to verify the score
stated by the RSU. Figure 4(b) represents the verification
overheads for the experiments mentioned above. The ver-
ification process consists of four major operations: system
setup, public and private key generation, the verification
of feedback scores and NIZK proof. The aggregate time for
100K is around 380 seconds.
Table 8.2 reports the communication bandwidth required
for the exchange of data from the vehicle to the tally system.
The number of objects varies from 50 to 3000. Table also
represents the communication overhead required for the
verification of vehicle score and the aggregating of the final
score. The number of feedback providers varies from 1000
to 100K. The verification overhead for a large number of
cryptograms is high but in a real scenario, it is acceptable
as the RSU normally has high-end resources for processing
and storing user data.
9 CONCLUSION
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a network of connected ve-
hicles and roadside units that enable participants to dissem-
inate information for an improved driving experience. The
dissemination of false information from malicious nodes in
the vehicular network could have negative consequences on
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traffic management and more significantly even cause a seri-
ous threat to life. There is a strong need to have a system that
enables drivers to evaluate the trustworthiness of a message
sender before making any decision based upon the received
information. In this paper, we have presented a TrustVote
system, a decentralized privacy-preserving reputation pro-
tocol to evaluate the trustworthiness of vehicles in the
Internet of Vehicle network without relying on the trusted
system. Our system utilizes a homomorphic cryptographic
system for hiding the feedback of vehicles and reveals noth-
ing more than just the aggregate reputation of vehicles in the
end. The system prevents malicious vehicles from providing
out-of-range feedback values and ensures correct computa-
tion even in the presence of malicious vehicles. The salient
features of a TrustVote system include: 1) a decentralized
system without requiring trust third parties, 2) providing
weighted aggregation, 3) preventing malicious participants
from providing illegal feedback, and 4) low communica-
tion and computation overheads. We evaluate the protocol
through a prototype implementation. The evaluation results
show that the system has reasonable communication and
communication overheads while having important features
of privacy-preservation and decentralization.
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